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IN 1832. Clausewit' maintained that,

[T]o impose our will on the enemy is [the] object of force .... The fighting
force must be destroyed: tha t is they must be put in such a condition that they can no
longer carry on the fight .. .. War is an act of force, there is no logical limitation to
the application of force .... Attached to force are certain imperceptible limitations

hardly worth mentioning, known as internatioTUlllaw and custom, but they scarcely
weaken it . ... [In fact,] kind-hearted people might ... think there was some
ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and
might imagine that is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a
fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes
which come from kindness are the very worst.... [However,] if civilized nations
do not put their prisoners to death or devastate cities and countries, it is because
intelligence plays a larger part in their methods [than was the case among
savages] and has taught them more effective ways of using force than the crude
expression of instinct.1

In response to this assertion, it might be said that the very "intelligence" to
which he refers as playing a larger part in the methods of warfare, in fact
expresses itself in the very rules of international law and custom which he
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cynically derides as "hardly worth mentioning." As if to confirm this, reference
may be made to the comment by General Colin Powell when submitting his
report to the United States Congress on "The Role of the Law of War" during
Operation DESERT STORM. In opening, the general stated, "Decisions were
impacted by legal considerations at every level, [the law of war] proved
valuable in the decision-making process."z
Before we can legitimately comment on the issue oflegal control-the jus in

bello-it is necessary to pay some attention to the lawfulness of war itself-the
jus ad bellum. In earlier times this meant deciding whether the war was being
fought for a "just" cause, a characterization largely dependent on whether the
war received the approval of the church.3 In accordance with the views of
Machiavelli, this soon came to mean that any war in which a Christian prince
was engaged was obviously "just"4 and "a necessary war is a just war, lIS while the
"fathers" of international law sought to set out a variety of causes which would
enable a ruler-justly-to resort to the use of force, normally in the name of
self-defense. With the rise of socialism and the workers' movement, the
concept of "justness" shifted, so that the only "just war" was the "class war."
However, in practice this was shown to be nothing but an ideology, for with but
few exceptions even the "workers" were prepared to defend their country when
it was a victim of aggression.
The first international steps towards declaring war illegal came with the
adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations.6 While this did not
expressly ban war, it sought to limit the occasions on which a League member
could resort to force. In accordance with Article 16, "should any Member of
the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants ... , it shall ipso facto be
deemed to have committed an act of war against all Members of the League,"
thereby laying itself open to the imposition of economic sanctions. In practice,
as demonstrated in, for example, the !talo-Ethiopian war, this did not really
amount to a great deal. The practical difficulty of forbidding war and making
resort thereto an offense against international law may be seen in the fate of the
draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance drawn up by the League Assembly in 1923.7
This solemnly proclaimed "that aggression is an international crime," with the
parties undertaking that "no one will be guilty of its commission." The
"criminal" penalty envisaged was purely financial. Since it proved impossible to
define "aggression," the treaty remained a draft. The same fate befell the 1924
Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security.s Equally abortive was the League's
Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement ofInternational Disputes of 1924.9
By this, "a war of aggression constitutes a violation of [the] solidarity [of the
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members of the international community] and an international crime; ... and
[with a view to] ensuring the repression of international crimes" the parties
forswore war save by way of "resistance to acts of aggression or when acting in
agreement with the Councilor the Assembly of the League of Nations in
accordance with provisions of the Covenant and of the present Protocol." As
with earlier exercises, there was no provision for criminal liability, other than
financial sanctions. The same is true of the various hortatory or declaratory
resolutions to similar effect adopted by both the League Assembly or the
Conference of American States. This did not, however, inhibit the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg from resting part of its finding
that aggressive war was criminal at international law on these non,binding
instruments. 10
It was not until Secretary of State Frank Kellogg of the United States and
Foreign Minister Aristide Briand of France proposed the agreement which
carries their names, officially the Pact of Paris for the Renunciation of War,
that any treaty dealing with the "legality" of war was adopted. The 1928 Pact
was somewhat simple in its terms, merely stating that the High Contracting
Parties-by the outbreak of World War II this included almost all independent
States-"condemn recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy [and] agree
that the settlement of or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature
or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be
brought about except by peaceful means."ll
The sole sanction indicated in the Pact is denial of the benefits provided by
it to the offender. An appreciation of what this might mean is to be found in the
Articles ofInterpretation adopted by the International Law Association at its
Budapest meeting in 1934. 12 Having stated the obvious, that a party resorting
to armed force to solve an international dispute "is guilty of a violation of the
Pact," as is any State assisting such a violator, the Articles go on to provide that
a victim of such a violation, as well as all other signatories, "may"-not
"shall"-deny the violator all the rights of a belligerent. Signatories are also
excused from any of the normal obligations attaching to neutrality, so that they
would be entitled to assist the victim with finances, supplies, and even armed
forces. Equally, the aggressor would not be entitled to receive recognition
either de facto or de jure of any territorial or other advantage ensuing from the
aggression. Finally, the aggressor would be liable to pay compensation for all
damage incurred by any party as a result of the breach.
It is noticeable that the Budapest Articles of Interpretation say nothing
about the criminality of an act of aggression in breach of the Pact.
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Nevertheless, the Nuremberg Tribunal apparently found no difficulty in
asserting that "the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national
policy [in the Pact] necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is
illegal in internationallawj and that those who plan and wage such a war ... are
committing a crime in so doing.... War [is] essentially an evil thing. Its
consequences are not confined to the belligerent states alone, but affect the
whole world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an
international crimej it is the supreme international crime differing only from
other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the
whole."n
This statement calls for comment. In the first place, the Tribunal has
ignored the fact that not every breach of an agreement--or even of
legislation-constitutes a crime. Second, the interpretation of the Pact in this
way is completely gratuitous and unnecessary. By Article 6 (a) of the London
Charter establishing the Tribunal, among the crimes against peace over which
the Tribunal is granted jurisdiction is "planning, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties. . . ." It follows,
therefore, that it is the constituent instrument of the Tribunal which has
rendered criminal a war of aggression or breach of the Pact, which is merely an
"international treaty." It was thus completely redundant for the Tribunal to go
into any detailed study of draft or other documents to ascertain whether such a
war was criminal or not.
Not even the Charter of the United Nations, at least not express is verbis,
speaks of the criminality of war. Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, simply provide
that "all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered. [They] shall refrafn in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." The only clear sanction should these commitments be
ignored depends on the Security Council and its decision to invoke the
provisions in Chapter VII relating to a threat to the peace, a breach of the
peace, or an act of aggression. Should the Council authorize military action in
such circumstances, those complying with the decision are not in breach of
any legal requirement. Other than this, the only recourse to armed conflict
that is permitted under the Charter is by way of
against an armed
attack. Other recourse to arms would constitute an act of aggression and a
crime in the light of the Nuremberg judgment, for the General Assembly has
affirmed the Principles ofInternational Law Recognized by the Charter of the
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Nuremberg Tribunal, 14 and authorized the International Law Commission to
draw up a Statement of Principles Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the TribunaljlS these Principles
are now generally regarded as constituting part of international customary
law.
Even if it is claimed that a resort to arms is in accordance with Article 51 of
the Charter, problems may arise as to whether the claim is justified and
self,defense legally resorted to. By Article 51, it may only occur in response to
an armed attack. However, the article describes the right as being "inherent,"
which raises the question whether it may be resorted to by way of preventive or
anticipatory action,16 since it is hardly likely that the draftsmen of the Charter
intended a "victim" to wait until it was, for example, devastated by nuclear
attack before taking steps to defend itself. Moreover, since the right is
"inherent,"17 it cannot be presumed that the members of the United Nations
have less right to defend themselves than do non,members. War, other than
under these conditions, would constitute aggression and thus amount to an
international crime in accordance with the exposition of the law as given at
Nuremberg. If war is illegal and criminal, say the cynics, how can one speak of
the law of war? Is not this completely out of line with the normal rules
concerning criminal law? It is not usual to declare a particular act to be a crime
and then lay down rules as to how that crime is to be committed. Such an
approach, however, betrays a lack of historical knowledge and any appreciation
of the purpose of the law of war.
Even in the Old Testament there are instances of the significance of
restraints on the conduct of war. During their conquest of Canaan, the
Israelites conducted many campaigns of total destruction, but this only
happened when the war in which they were engaged was undertaken at the
direct order of God and directed against heathens who had rejected Him. To
show mercy would be a sin against the Lord. 1s Even in such a war, however,
they were exhorted to have recourse to siege only if the city involved had
rejected an opportunity to surrender.
When thou earnest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace
unto it. And ... if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then ... all
the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee. And ifit will make
no peace with thee, but will make war against thee, then thou shalt besiege it.
And when the Lord thy God hath delivered it into thine hands, thou shalt smite
every male thereof with the edge of the sword: But the women, and little ones,
and the cattle, and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt thou take
unto thyself; and thou shalt eat the spoil of thine enemies.... When thou shalt
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besiege a city a long time in making war against it to take it, thou shalt not
destroy the trees thereof by wielding an axe against them; for thou mayest eat of
them, but thou shalt not cut them down; for is the tree of the field man, that it
shall be besieged of thee? Only the trees of which thou knowest that they are not
trees for food, them thou mayest destroy and cut down, that thou mayest build
bulwarks against the city that makes war with thee, until it fall.!9

It would appear, therefore, that ecological considerations were significant
even then, forbidding destruction of resources essential to the survival of man.
Maimonides, perhaps the greatest of Jewish Diaspora scholars, states that the
destruction of fruit trees for the mere purpose of afflicting the civilian
population is prohibited, and Rabbi Ishmael goes so far as to state that "not only
fruit trees but, by argument from minor to major, stores of fruit itself may not be
destroyed."zo
Not until Protocol I annexed to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 was
adopted in 1977 was a similar principle embodied in the international
black,letter law of armed conflict. Even then, "objects indispensable to the
civilian population" may not be attacked or destroyed, unless they "are used ...
as sustenance solely for the members of [the adverse party's] forces ... or in
direct support of military action," but in the latter case care must be taken to
ensure that the civilian population is not left "with such inadequate food or
water as to cause its starvation or force its movement."Z!
The Israelites were also enjoined to restrain themselves in their dealings
with enemy combatants. Thus, "rejoice not when thine enemy falleth, and let
not thine heart rejoice when he stumbleth; lest the Lord see it, and it
displeases Him, and He turn away His wrath from him."zz Moreover, insofar
as prisoners of war are concerned, "if thine enemy be hungry, give him bread
to eat; and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink." This injunction goes so
far as to inspire the prophet Elisha to reply to the king's inquiry whether he
might kill his prisoners: "Thou shalt not smite them: would est thou smite
those whom thou hast taken captive with thy sword and with thy bow? Set
bread before them, that they may eat and drink and go to their master. And
he prepared great provision for them: and when they had eaten and drunk, he
sent them away and they went to their master."Z4 Even in those instances
when the Torah or the Prophets indicated that extreme action be taken
against an enemy,
the rabbis softened the impact of much of the old law through reinterpretation or
imaginative explanation. Due to this it seems that the Israelites were indeed a
"merciful" people when compared with their neighbors, such as the Assyrians.
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Although, as in any case, exceptions and violations to regulations occurred, on
the whole, the Israelite warriors conducted themselves in a disciplined, restricted
manner in accordance with rules and regulations derived from divine
inspira tion. 24

However, breaches of these injunctions were, for the main part at least, only
subject to divine punishment.
The Israelites were not alone among the ancients whose conduct of war was
under restraints. Sun Tzu, in his The Art of War, is one of the most ancient
commentators on warfare, and in his view, "Generally in war the best policy is
to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy's army is
better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company or a five,man
squad is better than to destroy them.... To subdue the enemy without fighting
is the acme of skill.... The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only
when there is no alternative." 25 Even as early as the seventeenth century B.C.,
the Chinese were applying what may only be described as principles of chivalry
when engaged in conflict, it being "deemed unchivalrous . . . [to take]
advantage of a fleeing enemy who was having trouble with his chariot ... [or
to] attack an enemy state ... when it was divided by internal troubles." 26
Similarly, some measures of humanitarianism are to be found in both the
Ramayana27 and the Mahabharata,28 postulating a series of principles regulating
conduct in war, many of which have only recently been accepted as part of the
modem law of war: "When he fights his foes in battle, let him not strike with
weapons concealed in wood, nor with such as are barbed, poisoned, or the
points of which are blazing with fire. 29 Neither poisoned nor barbed weapons
should be used. These are weapons of the wicked."30 Foretelling the modem
rule relating to proportionality,3! as well as the ideological-and
unrealistic-view of those who assert that sophisticated weapons should not be
used against unsophisticated peoples,
A car warrior should fight a car warrior. One on horse should fight one on horse.
Elephant riders must fight with elephant riders, as one on foot fights a foot
soldier. When the antagonist has fallen into distress he should not be struck:
brave warriors do not shoot at one whose arrows are exhausted. No one should
strike another that is retreating.J2 ••• [L]et him remember the duty of honourable
warriorsj do not kill a man when he is down, even a wicked enemy, if he seeks
shelter, should not be slain.

The Sanskrit writers, in their treatment of noncombatants, remind us of the
remark attributed by Shakespeare's Henry V to Fluellen at Agincourt in 1415:
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"Kill the boys and the luggage! 'Tis expressly against the law of arms: 'tis as
arrant a piece of knavery as can be offer'd."33 These early epics warn us that:
[Clar-drivers, men engaged in the transport of weapons, ... should never be
slain. No one should slay him who goes out to procure forage or fodder, camp
followers or those that do menial service. No one should kill him that is skilled in
a special art. He is no son of the Vishni race who slayeth a woman, a boy or an old
man. Let him not strike one who has been grievously wounded. A wounded
opponent shall either be sent to his own home, or if brought to the victor's
quarters, have his wounds attended to, and when cured he shall be set at liberty.
This is eternal duty.34 Night slaughter is horrible and infamous. With death our
enmity has terminated.

Thus, any desecration of a corpse, such as taking of ears or other mementos,
was forbidden. Finally, as to the treatment of occupied territory and its
inhabitants, "Customs, laws and family usages which obtain in a country should
be preserved when that country has been acquired. Having conquered the
country of his foe, let him not abolish or disregard the laws of that country. A
king should never do such injury to his foe as would rankle in the latter's
heart.,,35
It becomes evident from these examples that many of the rules of the
ancients go further than what is to be found in either the Hague or the Geneva
law.36 They indicate that the ancients considered war an unfortunate
occurrence, with the ensuing damage to be kept to a minimum and every effort
made to secure a peaceful and fruitful future for both the victor and the
vanquished. This interpretation accords with that of Gibbon commenting on
the behaviour of the Scythians in the fifth century,
In all their invasions of the civilized empires of the South, the Scythian
shepherds have been uniformly actuated by a savage and destructive spirit. The
laws of war that restrain the exercise of national rapine and murder, are founded
on two principles of substantial interest: the knowledge of the permanent.
benefits which may be obtained by a moderate use of conquest; and a just
aPl?rehension lest the desolation which we inflict on the enemy's country may be
retaliated on our own. But these considerations of hope and fear are almost
unknown in the pastoral state of nations.37

One is sometimes caused to wonder whether they are any more known or
applied in industrial States!
long before the period to which Gibbon was referring, there was some
regulation ofwhat was allowed during war. This becomes clear if one looks to
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the practice of ancient Greece and Rome, in which urban centers in the form of
cities, and
were well established. A leading commentator has said,
The rule and principles of war were considered by both Hellas and Rome to be
applicable only to civilized sovereign States properly organized, and enjoying a
regular constitution; and not conglomerations of individuals living together in
an irregular and precarious association. Rome did not regard as being within
the comity of nations such fortuitous gatherings of people, but only those who
were organized on a civilized basis, and governed with a view to the general
good, by a properly constructed system of law.... Hence barbarians, savage
tribes, bands of robbers and pirates, and the like were debarred from the
benefits and relaxations established by international law and custom.... [A]s
to the general practice of war in Hellas[,] we find remarkable oscillations of
wartime policy. Brutal treatment and noble generous conduct are manifested
at the same epoch, in the same war, and apparently under similar
circumstances. At times we hear of proceedings which testify to the intellectual
and artistic temperament of the Greeks; at other times, we read narratives
which emphasise the fundamental cruelty and disregard of human claims
prevalent amongst the ancient races when at war with each other. In Homer ...
hostilities for the most part assumed the form of indiscriminate brigandage, and
were but rarely conducted with a view to achieving regular conquests, and
extending the territory of the victorious community. Extermination rather
than subjection of the enemy was the usual practice .... Sometimes prisoners
were sacrificed to the gods, corpses mutilated and mercy refused to children,
and to the old and sickly. On the other hand, acts of mercy and nobility were
frequent .... The adoption of certain cowardly, inhuman practices, such as, for
example, the use of poisoned weapons, was condemned....38 In reference to
the conduct of war in Greece, it is important to remember that it was between
small States, whose subjects were to an extraordinary degree animated by
that every individual was a
patriotism and devotion to their
who saw his home, his life, his family, his gods, at stake, and,
finally, that he regarded each and every subject of the opposing States as his
personal adversary....39 [Nevertheless,] temples, and priests, and embassies
were considered inviolable .... Mercy was shown to ... helpless captives.
Prisoners were ransomed and exchanged.
were granted and
respected. Truces and armistices were established and, for the most part,
faithfully observed. . . . Buriai of dead was permitted; and graves were
unmolested. It was considered wrong and impious to cut off or poison the
enemy's water supply, or to make use of poisoned weapons. Treacherous
stratagems of every description were condemned as being contrary to civilized
of the law
warfare. And ... it is essential to emphasize that the
and universally accepted custom relating to them is not necessarily proved
when we point here and there to conduct of a contrary nature.40
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This latter point is not always sufficiently acknowledged in our own time.
The same commentator goes on to point out that by the time of the Roman
empire the nature of the State had changed with Rome a centralized authority.
Now, the practices in war
varied according as their wars were commenced to exact vengeance for gross
violations of international law, or for delfberate acts of treachery. Their warlike
usages varied also according as their adversaries were regular enemies . . . or
uncivilized barbarians41 and bands of pirates and marauders .... The Roman
conduct [under Germanicus] far transcended in its civilized and humane
character that of the German leader, Arminius, who is reported [by Tacitus42 ] to
have burnt to death and otherwise barbarously43 slain the centurions and
tribunes of the Varian legions, and nailed their skulls to trees. Undoubtedly, the
belligerent operations of Rome, from the point of view of introducing various
mitigations in the freld, and adopting a milder policy after victory,# are distinctly
of a progressive character. They were more regular and disciplined than those of
any other ancient nation. They did not as a rule degenerate into indiscriminate
slaughter and unrestrained devastation. The ius belli imposed restrictions on
barbarism, and condemned all acts of treachery.... [Livy teUs US45 ] there were
laws of war as well as peace, and the Romans had learnt to put them into practice
not less justly than bravely. . . . The Romans [says Cicero46 ] refuse to
countenance a criminal attempt made on the life of even a foreign aggressor.47

In so far as Islam is concerned, the Caliph Abu Bakr commanded his troops,
"[L]et there be no perfidy, no falsehood in your treaties with the enemy, be
faithful to all things, proving yourselves upright and noble and maintaining
your word and promises truly."4S The ninth century Islamic statement on the
law of nations bans the killing of women, children, the aged, the blind, the
crippled and helpless insane. 49 Moreover, while fighting was in progress
between the dar al,Islam (the territory ofIslam) and the dar al,harb (the rest of
the world, also known as the "territory of war"), "Muslims were under legal
obligations to respect the rights of non,Muslims, both combatants and
civilians." Booty did not belong to the captor but was to be shared according to
set rules. "The prisoner of war should not be killed, but he may be ransomed or
set free by grace," although if it would be advantageous to the Muslims,
non,Muslim prisoners could be killed unless they converted, when they would
be regarded as booty.50
Once we come to the age of chivalry, we find the role of the Church
significant, piuticularly as it frequently reflected the desires of the orders of
knighthood. Thus, the condemnation of the use of the crossbow and the arc by
the Second Lateran Council in 1139 coincided with the views of the knightly
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orders who fought
and considered such weapons disgraceful
since they could be used from a distance by an unseen foe, including villians,
who could strike without the risk of being struck himself.51 The axe, mace,
halberd,
military fork, and a variety of lances used by the
knights for close combat and dismounting an opponent were merely
variants of the striking weapons of the ancients, which had been "confined to
arm, foot, or
instruments [as well as]
and swords; thrusting spears; and missile weapons, such as the
or
bow, or the
hurled spear, or javelin, the arrow propelled by
The striking edge or point of these weapons [had been] of hard
wood, stone, bone, or metal.,,52
As
warriorgS3 disappeared, their specialized weapons fell into
desuetude; they are now considered illegal. The process of condemnation and
potential rejection was assisted by the Church, anathemizing such weapons as
darts and catapults "in order to reduce as far as possible the engines of
destruction and death."54 Despite the condemnation of weapons causing
numerous deaths, gunpowder was soon in common use, although in 1439,
"when the army of Bologna, using a new handgun, killed a number of
Venetians, feeling ran so high at this disregard for the game of
war, that the victorious Venetians massacred all prisoners who had stooped so
low as to use this 'cruel and cowardly innovation,' gunpowder. It would, if
unchecked, they said, make fighting a positively DANGEROUS profession.,,55
Such disregard of the rules led Belli to comment a century later that "today
regard is so far lacking for this [Church] rule that firearms of a thousand kinds
are the most common and popular implements of war, as if too few avenues of
death had been discovered in the centuries, had not the generations of our
fathers, rivaling God with his lightning, invented this means whereby, even at a
single discharge, men are sent to perdition by the hundreds."56
The "law of chivalry" was nothing but a customary code of chivalrous
conduct recognized by the feudal knights as controlling their affairs.57 This was
enforced by arbitrators specially appointed and even by Courts of Chivalry.58
As early as 1307, such courts were trying breaches of parole,59 considered a
major disregard of the "law of arms"-a system so well recognized that when in
1370 at the siege of Limoges the English commander issued orders forbidding
quarter, three captured French knights appealed to John of Gaunt and the Earl
of Cambridge, "My Lords we are yours: you have vanquished us. Act therefore
to the law of arms." Their lives were spared, and they were treated as prisoners
who could, of course, be ransomed. 6O The principles of the law of arms were
sufficiently well recognized by the time of Elizabeth that, as has already been
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pointed out, Shakespeare could make specific reference to them when writing
of Henry V's conduct at Agincourt.61
By the middle of the fifteenth century, the Constable of France was trying a
variety of ecorcheur captains for war crimes. 62 Perhaps more significant was the
1474 trial by a tribunal made up of representatives of the Hanseatic cities of
Peter ofHagenbach for administering occupied territory in a manner "contrary
to the laws of God and of man." His plea that he had been carrying out the
orders of his lord was rejected, and he was executed.63
The rules of chivalry did not apply to the ordinary foot soldier, whose
conduct was regulated by national military codes giving commanders the
"rights of justice" over miscreants. Thus, the 1385 code of Richard II of
England forbade pillage of the church, victuals, provisions, or forage; also,
among other things it provided for parole by prisoners, who were not to be
considered property of their captors, but of the king.64 By the fifteenth century,
when nearly all men,at,arms were included in official musters, subject to
disciplinary codes of this kind, enforcement of the law became easier. By the
seventeenth century most of the countries of Europe had such codes forbidding
violence against women, marauding of the countryside, individual acts against
the enemy unless authorized by a superior, private taking or keeping of booty,
or the private detention of any prisoner.65 Of these codes it has been said that
together with the rules of international law, they constitute "Ie meilleur [rein

pratique pour imposer aux armees Ie respect d'un modus legitimus de mener les
guerres. ,,66
As to the position of women, the French knights had been adamant in
protecting the modesty of those found in surrendered cities, and Coligny made
violence against them punishable by death.67 By the beginning of the
seventeenth century the honor of women was so well established that Gentili
could state that "to violate the honour of women will always be held to be
unjust," quoting as evidence the view of Alexander, "I am not in the habit of
warring with prisoners and women."68 This would suggest that the rape of
women has from earliest times been considered a war crime. Moreover, in the
Lieber Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in
the Field, 1863, which formed the basis of most subsequent military codes,
express provision is made, with respect to providing protection of inhabitants
in occupied territories, for the protection of women. 69 In 1974, the General
Assembly Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in
Emergency and Armed Conflict proVided that "all forms of repression and
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inhuman treatment of women ... committed by belligerents in the course of
military operations or in occupied territories shall be considered criminal."7o
More recently, 1977 Protocol I annexed to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
expressly states, "Women shall be the object of special respect and shall be
protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of
indecent assault."71 This series of provisions leads one to question the integrity
and purpose of those feminists who now seek to have rape specifically declared
a war crime, particularly since it has been charged as such in many of the
indictments issued by the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
In earlier days, combatants were not
with the fate of the
wounded, particularly those belonging to an enemy, and this was especially so
during the religious campaigns of the Crusades. Nevertheless, by the twelfth
century the knights of the Order of St. John had established a hospital in
Jerusalem for the care of the sick and injured, and by the sixteenth century they
had established themselves as the Sovereign Order of Malta with the same
purpose in mind. About the same time, writers were beginning to assert that
doctors, who were often in clerical orders, enjoyed a special immunity. In the
early part of the fourteenth century Bartolus maintained they were free from
seizure, and Belli used this as a basis for stating that during war, the "persons of
doctors may not be seized, and they must not be haled to court or otherwise
harassed.'172 By the time of Louis XIV, attention had been directed to providing
for the care of the wounded; in a 1708 decree a permanent medical service was
established "a la suite des armees et dans les places de guerre.'173 During the siege of
Metz in 1552-1553 Franc:;:ois de Guise summoned the French surgeon
Ambroise Para "to succour the abandoned wounded soldiers of the enemy and
to make arrangements for their transport back to their army"74-a practice not
embodied into treaty law until three centuries later.15
During later conflicts, a variety of reciprocal arrangements were made for
the care of the wounded, of which only one or two need be mentioned.
[The) convention made in 1743, between Lord Stair on behalf of the Pragmatic
army and the Marshal Noailles for the French during the Dettingen campaign
bound both sides to treat hospitals and wounded with consideration. Noailles,
when he felt that his operations might cause alarm to the inmates of the hospitals
at T echenheim, went so far as to send word that they should rest tranquil as they
would not be disturbed. A fuller and more highly developed type of agreement
was signed at L'Ecluse in 1759 by the Marshal de Baril, who commanded the
French, and
Conway, the British general officer commanding.
The hospital staff, chaplains, doctors, surgeons and apothecaries were not ... to
be taken prisoners; and if they should happen to be apprehended within the lines
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of the enemy, they were to be sent back immediately. The wounded of the enemy
who should fall into the hands of their opponents were to be cared for, and their
food and medicine should in due course be paid for. They were not to be made
prisoner and might stay in hospital safely under guard.... Peyrilhe in 1780
proposed
recognition of the principle that the wounded should not
be made prisoners of war and should not enter into the balance of exchanges.76

It was not, however, until after Dunant's Souvenir of Solferino in 1862 that this
form of ad hoc arrangement received permanence and international recognition
by way of the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross.17
The Middle Ages saw other customs developing which have ceased to be of
topical importance, although in some instances they have been responsible for
current practices. During the Hundred Years War it was possible to distinguish
between guerre mortelle, war to the death; bellum hostile, a war between
Christian princes in which prisoners could ransom themselves; guerre
guerriable, fought in accordance with the feudal rules of chivalry; and the truce,
which indicated a temporary cessation of hostilities d\,lring which the-wounded
and dead might be collected. Any resumption of actual fighting following a
truce was considered a continuation of an ongoing conflict rather than
commencement of a new one-an attitude which applies at present with
regard to the relations between Israel and those of her Arab neighbors with
whom no peace treaty has yet been signed. Each category of conflict had its
own rules, but they were rules of honor rather than oflaw or humanitarianism.
Unless it was a conflict in which no quarter was to be given-and this was
indicated by raising a red pennant1s-prisoners and others enjoying immunity,
such as heralds, carried a white wand or even a white paper in their
head,dress-is this the origin of the white flag?-and were frequently allowed
freedom of movement under safe,conducts or were employed as messengers
between the contending forces. 79
In order to appreciate the reasons for and nature of the law of war, it is not
enough just to look to the practices of the Middle Ages. Reference must also be
made to the writings of the classical writers on international law, for to the
extent that these were consistent or expressed commonly held views prevalent
at the time, their writings constitute evidence of customary law. Thus, in words
which are almost modem, Gentili wrote,
[Iln war ... victory is sought in no prescribed fashion .... Our only precaution
must be not to allow every kind of craft and every kind of cunning device; for evil
is not lawful, but an enemy should be dealt with according to law.... In dealing
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with a just and lawful enemy we have the whole fetiallaw and many other laws in
common .... Necessity does not oblige us to violate the rights of our adversaries .
. . [but) the laws of war are not observed toward one who does not observe
them."so

This latter statement is of course not valid today, at least insofar as the
Geneva principles are concerned.
'
Grotius, commonly (though wrongly) described as "the father of
international law," is somewhat self,contradictory. First, he states that "by the
Law of Nations any Thing done against an Enemy is lawful ... It is lawful for an
Enemy to hurt another both in Person and Goods ... [and for] both sides to do
so without Distinction."sl However, later, when discussing Moderation'
concerning the Right of Killing Men in a Just War, he states that "there are
certain Duties to be observed even toward those who have wronged US"S2 and
calls for avoidance of useless fighting, which is "wholly repugnant to the Duty
of a Christian, and Humanity itself. Therefore all Magistrates ought strictly to
forbid these Things, for they must render an account for the unnecessary
shedding of Blood to him, whose Viceregents theyare.,,83
Having pointed out that the man in the field is forbidden from acting as if
the conflict were a private affair and so is neither to keep captured property for'
himself nor commit warlike acts after a retreat or an armistice,84 he continues:
It is not enough that we do nothing against the Rules of rigorous Justice, properly.
so called; we must also take Care that we offend not against charity, especially
Christian Charity. Now this may happen sometimes; when, for Instance, it
appears that such a plundering doth not so much hurt the [enemy) State, or the
King, or those who are culpable themselves, but rather the Innocent, whom it
may render so extremely miserable .... But farther, if the taking of this Booty
neither contributes to the finishing of the War, nor considerably weaken the
Enemy, the Gain arising to himself only from the Unhappiness of the Times,
would be highly unbecoming an honest Man, much more a Christian.... Yet if a
Soldier, or any other Person, even in a just War, shall burn the Enemy's House,
without any Command, and besides when there is no Necessity, or just Cause, in
the Opinion of the Divines he stands obliged to make Satisfaction for those
Damages. I have with Reason added ... if there be not a just Cause, for if
be, he may perhaps be answerable to his own State, whose orders he hath
transgressed, but not to his Enemy, to whom he hath done no wrong,85

Seeking a perspective which largely reflects what States actually did, we
might cite the views of Vat tel.
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Since the object of a just war is to overcome injustice and violence, and to use
force upon one who is deaf to the voice of reason, a sovereign has the right to do
to his enemy whatever is necessary to weaken him and disable him from
maintaining his unjust position; and the sovereign may choose the most
efficacious and appropriate means to accomplish that object, provided those
means be not essentially unlawful, and consequently forbidden by the Law of
Nations. A lawful end confers a right only to those means which are necessary to attain
that end. Whatever is done in excess of such measures is contrary to the natural law,
and must be condemned as evil before the tribunal of conscience.... [Als it is very
difficult sometimes to form a just estimate of what the actual situation demands,
and, moreover, as it is for each Nation to determine what its particular
circumstances warrant its doing, it becomes absolutely necessary that Nations
should mutuaUy conform to certain general rules on this subject. Thus, when it is clear
and well recognized that such a measure, such an act of hostility, is, in general,
necessary for overcoming the resistance of the enemy and attaining the object of
lawful war, the measure, viewed thus in the abstract, is regarded by the Law of
Nations as lawful and proper in war, although the belligerent who would make use
of it without necessity, when less severe measures would have answered his purpose,
would not be guiltless before God and his conscience. This is what constitutes the
difference between what is just, proper, and irreprehensible in war, and what is merely
permissible and may be done by Nations with impunity.86

Gentili, too, wrote of restraints in war-fit is] "only when we cannot
overcome their resistance and bring them to terms by less severe means, that
we are justified in taking away [the] lives" of the enemy.87 Equally condemned
were denial of quarter, reprisals against prisoners,88 violence against women,
children, the aged and the sick, ecclesiastics, men ofletters, husbandmen, and,
generally, all unarmed persons. Assassination, the use of poison and poisoned
weapons, as well as the poisoning of wells, streams and springs were also beyond
the pale.89
Of all classical writers, Vattel was the most concerned in seeking to limit
war's horrors:
Necessity alone justifies Nations in going to war; and they should all refrain from,

and as a matter of duty oppose, whatever tends to render war more disastrous . ... AU
acts of hostility which injure the enemy without necessity, or which do not tend to
procure victory, are unjustifiable and as such condemned by the natural law.... As
between Nation and Nation, we must lay down general rules, independent of
circumstances and of certain and easy application. Now, we can only arrive at
such rules by considering acts of hostility in the abstract and in their essential
character. Hence, ... the voluntary Law of Nations limits itself to forbidding acts that

are essentially unlawful and obnoxious, such as poisoning, assassination, treason, the
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massacre ofan enemy who has surrendered and from whom there is nothing to fear, ...
[and] condemns every act of hostility which . .. contributes nothing to the success of our
anns, and neither increases our strength nor weakens the enemy. On the other hand,
it permits or tolerates every act which in its essential nature is adapted to
attaining the end of the war; and it does not stop to consider whether the act was
unnecessary, useless or superfluous in a given case unless there is the clearest
evidence that an exception should have been made in that instance; for where the
e\lidence is clear freedom of judgment cannot be exercised. Thus it is not, generally
speaking, contrary to the laws of war to plunder and lay waste a country. But if an
enemy of greatly superior forces should treat in this manner a town or province
which he might easily hold possession of as a means of obtaining just and
advantageous terms of peace, he would be universaUy accused of waging war in a
barbarous and uncontroUed manner. The deliberate destruction of public
monuments, temples, tombs, statues. pictures, etc., is, therefore, absolutely
condemned ... , as being under no circumstances conducive to the lawful object
of war. The pillage and destruction of towns, the devastation of the open country
by fire and sword, are acts no less to be abhorred and condemned when they are
committed without evident necessity or urgent reasons.90

It is of interest to note that it was not until the adoption of Protocol I in
197791 that impedimenta of the world's cultural heritage92 or objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs,
agricultural areas, crops, drinking water installations and the like, came under
treaty protection.
The American Civil War produced the first modern codification of
regulations for use during conflict, with the promulgation by President
Abraham Lincoln of the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field,93 which had been prepared by Professor Francis Lieber of
Columbia. Lieber's motivation in preparing this draft may be seen from his
PoUtical Ethics; "War by no means absolves us from allobUgations toward the enemy.
. . . They result in part from the object of war, in part from the fact that the
belligerents are human beings, that the declaration of war is, among civilized
nations, always made upon tacit acknowledgment of certain uses and obligations. 1194
In accordance with the Code:
[Mlilitary necessity does not admit of cruelty-that is, the infliction of suffering
for the sake of suffering or for revenge- ... the unarmed person is to be spared in
person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit... .
[Plrotection of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile country is the rule .... The
United States acknowledge[sl and protect(s), in hostile country occupied by
them, religion and morality; strictly private property; the persons of the
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inhabitants, especially those of women; and the sacredness of domestic relations.
Offenses in the country shall be rigorously punished.... All wanton violence
committed against persons in the invaded country[;] ... all robbery ... or
sacking, even after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming or
killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death.... Crimes
punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, assaults, highway robbery,
theft, burglary, fraud, forgery and rape, if committed by an American soldier in a
hostile country against its inhabitants, are not only punishable as at home, but in
all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severer punishment shall be
preferred. 95

The Code also recognized that prisoners were to be protected and that it was
forbidden to deny quarter. Further, the rights of chaplains and medical
personnel were confirmed, as was the ban on any discrimination in the
treatment of enemy personnel. It also forbade the use of enemy colors, which
would now be considered as perfidy. While aimed at the conduct of American
forces, the Code went further, acknowledging the right to punish what would
today be described as war crimes: "A prisoner of war remains answerable for his
crimes committed against the captor's army or people, committed before he
was captured, and for which he has not been punished by his own
authorities."96 As to the problem of members of a force of an enemy State
considered to be engaged in an "unjust" war,
[t]he law of nations . .. admits of no rules or laws different from those of regular
warfare, regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, although they may belong to
the army of a government which the captor may consider as a wanton and unjust
assailant.97 Modem wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the
enemy is the object.98 The destruction of the enemy in a modem war, and,
indeed, modem war itself, are means to obtain the object of the belligerent which
lies beyond the war. Unnecessary or revengeful destruction of life is not lawful. 99

The rules enunciated in the Lieber Code were so consistent with current
military practice that similar codes or manuals were soon issued by Prussia, the
Netherlands, France, Russia, Serbia, Argentina, Great Britain, and Spain. IOO
But there was no internationally agreed document setting out the rules and
principles. However, to the extent that they and the writings of acknowledged
international law authorities express agreement, they may be regarded as opinio
juris ac necessitatis, thus constituting the customary law of armed conflict.
Insofar as they have not been overruled by treaty or expressly rejected by a
State, especially a significant military power, they are as obligatory as any other
rules of international law.101
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International efforts aimed at controlling activities in conflict had already
begun in the middle of the nineteenth century. The Declaration of Paris of
1856102 was concerned with some selected aspects of maritime warfare, but
more significant was the 1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Wounded in Armies in the Field. 103 Adopted only one year after the
establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross, it recognized
the immunity of the symbol and those wearing it. This Convention initiated a
series of Geneva Conventions (1906, 1929, and 1949, culminating in the
Protocols of 1977) directed at the treatment and protection of those hors de
combat-the wounded on land or at sea, prisoners of war, civilians and other
noncombatants-and known as the Geneva Law or international
humanitarian law.
As to the methods of warfare, the first international effort at control was the
1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg directed against the use of lightweight
explosive bullets,I04 and it is worth noting the motive for such ban, as expressed
in the Preamble:
[H)aving by common agreement fixed the technical limits at which the
necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements ofhumanity ... [the parties)
declare ... That the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating
as much as possible the calamities of war; That the only legitimate object which
States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military
forces of the enemy; That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest
possible number of men; That this object would be exceeded by the employment
of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their
death inevitable; That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be
contrary to the laws ofhumanity.105

With these lofty motives in mind, the Declaration banned their use on a
reciprocal basis among those States which adhered to the Declaration. In fact,
only nineteen European States did so.
Even fewer States attended the 1874 Brussels Conference that drew up a
Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of
War. This postulated principles concerning the administration of occupied
territory, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, the
conduct of sieges and bombardments, as well as the treatment of spies,
prisoners of war, and the sick and wounded. While the Project never came into
force, we should not overlook the reiteration of the preambular terms of St.
Petersburg, nor the even more significant statement that:
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by revising the laws and general usages of war, whether with the object of
defining them with greater precision, or with the view of laying down, by a
common agreement, certain limits which will restrain, as far as possible, the
severities of war, [war} ... would involve less suffering, would be less liable to those

aggravations produced by uncertainty, unforeseen events, and the passions excited by
the struggle; it would tend more surely to that which should be its final objective, viz., the
re-establishment of good relations, and a more solid and lasting peace between the
belligerent States. 106
The Project embodied a principle which is to be found in every treaty since.
By Article 12,
[T]he laws of war do not recognize in belligerents an unlimited power in the
adoption of means of injuring the enemy ... [and, Article 13, a]ccording to this
principle [the following acts] are especially forbidden: 107
(a) Employment of poison or poisoned weapons;
(b) Murder by treachery of individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army;
(c) Murder of an enemy who, having laid down his arms or having no longer
means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;
(d) The declaration that no quarter will be given;
(e) The employment of arms, projectiles or missiles calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering [now understood objectively as relating to what is
necessary for the achieving of an operation rather than subjectively as measured
by the individual on whom the suffering has been inflicted1OO1, as well as the use
of projectiles prohibited by the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868;
(f) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military
insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the
Geneva Convention;
(g) Any destruction or seizure of the enemy's property that is not imperatively
demanded by the necessity of war.

Largely building upon the Brussels Project, at its 1880 meeting the Institute
of International Law drew up the Oxford Manual on the Laws of \Var. Once
again, what is of major significance and reason for the law of war is the Preface
to the Manual:
War holds a great place in history, and it is not to be supposed that men will
soon give it up-in spite of the protests which it arouses and the horror which it
inspires-because it appears to be the only possible issue of disputes which
threaten the existence of States, their liberty, their vital interests. But the
gradual improvement in customs should be reflected in the method of
conducting war. It is worthy of civilized nations "to restrain the destructive force
of war, while recognizing its inevitable necessities." The problem is not easy of
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solution; however, some points have already been solved, and very recently the
draft Declaration of Brussels has been a solemn pronouncement of good
intentions of governments in this connection. It may be said that independently
of the international laws existing on this subject, there are today certain principles
of justice which guide the public conscience, which are manifested even by general
customs, but which it would be well to fix and make obligatory . ... The Institute does
not propose an international treaty, which it might perhaps be premature or at
least very difficult to obtain; but it believes it is fulfilling a duty in offering to the
governments a Manual suitable as the basis for national legislation in each S tate, and
in accord with the progress of juridical science and the needs of civilized annies. Rash
and extreme rules will not be found therein. The Institute has not sought
innovations in drawing up the Manual; it has contented itself with stating clearly

and codifying the accepted ideas of our age so far as this has appeared allowable and
practicable. By so doing, it believes it is rendering service to military men themselves. In
fact so long as the demands of opinion remain indeterminate, belligerents are
exposed to painful uncertainty and to endless accusations. A positive set of rules ...
if they are judicious, serves the interests of beUigerents and is far from hindering them,
since by preventing the unchaining of passions and savage instincts-which battle
always awakens, as much as it awakens courage and manly virtue-it strengthens
the discipline which is the strength of annies; it also ennobles their patriotic mission in
the eyes of the soldiers by keeping them within the limits of respect due to the rights of
humanity. But in order to attain this end it is not sufficient for sovereigns to
promulgate new laws. It is essential, too, that they make these laws known to all
people, so that when a war is declared, the men called to take up arms to defend the

causes of the beUigerent States, may be thoroughly impregnated with the special rights
and duties attached to the execution of such a command.109
Only a few of the Manual's provisions need be mentioned, and that because
they have, in almost identical wording, been embodied in the relevant treaties
beginning with the Hague Conference of 1899.
The state of war does not admit of acts of violence, save between the armed
forces of belligerent States.... Every beUigerent armed force is bound to conform to

the laws of war. The laws of war do not recognize in beUigerents an unlimited liberty as
to the means of injuring the enemy. They are to abstain especiaUy from all needless
severity . ... No invaded territory is regarded as conquered until the end of the
war; until that time the occupant exercises ... only de facto power, essentially
provisional in character.... It is forbidden to maltreat inoffensive populations ...
or employ arms, projectiles, or materials of any kind calculated to cause
superfluous suffering or to aggravate wounds . .. [or] to injure or kill an enemy who

has surrendered at discretion or is disabled, and to declare in advance that
quarter will not be given, even by those who do not ask it for themselves.u°
Wounded and sick soldiers should be brought in and cared for, to whatever
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nation they belong.... It is forbidden to rob or mutilate the dead lying on the
field of battle.... It is forbidden to attack and to bombard undefended places.
The commander of an attacking force, save in cases of open assault, shall, before
undertaking a bombardment, make every due effort to give notice thereof to the
local authorities.l1l ... Ambulances and hospitals for the use of armies are
recognized as neutral and should, as such, be protected and respected by
belligerents, so long as any sick or wounded are therein. 112• •• The occupant [of
enemy territory] should maintain the laws which were in force in the country in
time of peace, and should not modify, suspend, or replace them, unless necessary
[this proviso would permit amendment if the said laws ran counter to the
occupant's concept of moral conduct, so long. as that was in conformity with
accepted concepts of justice] .... The population of the invaded district cannot
be compelled to swear allegiance to the hostile Power.... Family honour and
rights, the lives of individuals, as well as their religious convictions and practice,
must be respected [again, this would not oblige an occupant to recognize
practices repulsive to its own way oflife] .... Prisoners of war are in the power of
the hostile government, but not in that of the individuals or corps who captured
them. They are subject to the laws and regulations in force in the army of the
enemy. They must be humanely treated .... Arms may be used, after summoning,
against a prisoner attempting to escape .... Prisoners cannot be compelled in any
manner to take any part whatever in the operation of war,113 nor compelled to
give information about their country or their army. Offenders against the laws of
war are liable to the punishment specified in the penal law .114

The penal law cited in the final quoted sentence would be the national law,
no provision for trial by any international tribunal having been made. Nor was
any obligation imposed requiring a national force to hand an accused offender
to the enemy so that he could be tried by an enemy tribunal.
Perhaps at this point it would be in order to comment upon the views as to
the law of war of one or two of the major players in international armed
conflict. According to Great Britain,
[t]he laws of war are the rules which govern the conduct of war-rules with
which, according to international law, belligerents and neutrals are bound to
comply. They are binding not only upon States as such but also upon their nationals
and, in particular, upon the individual members of the armed forces. In antiquity, and
in the earlier part of the Middle Ages, no rules of warfare existed. liS During the
latter part of the Middle Ages, however, the influence of Christianity as well as
that of chivalry made itself felt, and gradually the practice of warfare became less
savage. The present laws of war are the result of a slow growth. Isolated milder
practices became in the course of time usages, which at first were not
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accompanied by a sense of legal obligation, but which by custom (i.e., constant
practice accepted as law) and by treaties, gradually developed into legal rules ....
The laws of war consist, therefore, partly of customary rules which have grown up in
practice, and partly of written rules, that is to say, rules which have been expressly
agreed upon by governments in international treaties and conventions. . . . The
development of the law of war has been determined by three principles: first, the
principle that a belligerent is justified in applying compulsion and force of any kind,
to the extent necessary for the realisation of the purpose of war, that is, the
complete submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the least
possible expenditure of men, resources and money; secondly, the principle of
humanity, according to which kinds and degrees of violence which are not
necessary for the purpose of war are not permitted to a belligerent; and, thirdly,
the principle of chivalry, which demands a certain amount of fairness in offence
and defence, and a certain mutual respect between the opposing forces. The law
of war is inspired by the desire of all civilised nations to reduce the evils of war by:
(a) protecting both combatants and non-combatants from unnecessary suffering;
(b) safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the
hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and
civUians, and (c) facilitating the restoration of peaceY6

Although the United States manual, The Law of Land Warfare, is almost
identical in its wording,117 it stresses a point not included in the British
statement of underlying general principles:
The prohibitory effect of the law of war is not minimized by "military
necessity!,}" which has been defined as the principle which justifies those
measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing
the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. MUitary necessity has
been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and
conventional laws of war inasmuch as the latter have been developed and framed
with consideration for the concept of military necessity. us

Since both manuals refer to the importance of customary as well as
conventional law, it is useful to cite the comments in the United States text on
the sources of the law of war:
The law of war is derived from two principal sources:
(a) Lawmaking Treaties (or Conventions), such as the Hague and Geneva
Conventions.
(b) Custom. Although some of the law of war has not been incorporated in any
treaty or convention to which the United States is a party, this body of unwritten
or customary law is firmly established by the custom of nations and well defined by
recognized authorities on international law. Lawmaking treaties may be compared
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with legislative enacttnents in the national law of the United States and the
customary law of war with the unwritten Anglo-American common law.119
Despite this statement, it is not always easy to determine what a particular
State recognizes as customary law. This may be seen if we refer to the United
States attitude to the use of poison gas. As already indicated, poison of any kind
was regarded as illegal from earliest times and particularly in the writings of the
"fathers" of intemationallaw. Moreover, by the Geneva Protocol of 1925,120 to
which by the outbreak of World War II there were forty parties, with the
United States and Japan as the only major powers not ratifying or acceding, the
use of poisonous gas and bacteriological warfare was prohibited. Paragraph 38
of the United States manual states:
The United States is not a party to any treaty, now in force, that prohibits or
restricts the use in warfare of toxic or noxious gases, of smoke or incendiary
materials, or of bacteriological warfare. . . . The Geneva Protocol for the
prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of
bacteriological methods of warfare, ... has been ratified or adhered to by and is
now effective between a considerable number of States. However, the United
States Senate has refrained from giving its advice and consent to the ratification by the
United States, and it is accordingly not binding upon this country [emphasis added).
On the other hand, the United States Naval War College was of the opinion
that the "use of poisonous gases and those that cause unnecessary suffering is in
general prohibited;"121 in 1943, during World War II, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt stated, in response to reports "that the Axis powers are making
significant preparations indicative of [an] intention ... to loose upon mankind
such terrible and inhumane weapons [, that] ... use of such weapons has been
outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has not used
them, and I hope that we will never be compelled to use them. I state
categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such
weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.,,122 Despite the apparent
incompatibilities, the United States acceded to the Protocol in 1975, and the
Field Manual was amended.123 The amendment includes the introductory
comment, "Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases,
and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by
the general opinion of the civilised world"-words which had already appeared
in the text of the Protocol and repeated by the president in 1943! It would
appear, however, that the official view of the Department of the Army is that
gas is forbidden by conventional and not by customary law.
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While it is true that the manuals referred to are concerned with land
warfare, the principles enunciated are of general application and equally
significant as basic principles underlying air and maritime warfare.
By way of contrast, and reflecting the views of Clausewitz, 124 reference might
be made to the Introduction of the Gennan War Book:
[T]he "argument of war" permits every belligerent State to have recourse to all
means which enable it to attain the object of the war; still, practice has taught
the advisability of allowing in one's own interest the introduction of a limitation
in the use of certain methods of war and a total renunciation of the use of others.
Chivalrous feelings, Christian thought, higher civilization and, by no means least
of all, the recognition of one's own advantage, have led to a voluntary and
self-imposed limitation, the necessity of which is today tacitly recognized by all
States and their armies. They have led in the course of time, in the simple
transmission of knightly usage in the passages of arms, to a series of agreements,
hallowed by tradition, and we are accustomed to sum these up in the words
"usage of war" [Kriegsbrauch], "custom of war" [Kriegssitte], or "fashion of war"
[Kriegsmanier]. Customs of this kind have always existed, even in the times of
antiquity; they differed according to the civilization of the different nations and
their public economy, they were not always identical, even in one and the same
conflict, and they have in the course of time often changed; they are older than
any scientific law of war, they have come down to us unwritten, and moreover
they maintain themselves in full vitality; they have, therefore, won an assured
position in standing armies according as these latter have been introduced into
the systems of almost every European State. The fact that such limitations of the
unrestricted and reckless application of all the available means for the conduct of
war, and thereby the humanization of the customary methods of pursuing war,
really exist, and are actually observed by the armies of all civilized States, has in
the course of the nineteenth century often led to attempts to develop, to extend,
and thus to make universally binding these pre-existing usages of war; to elevate
them to the level oflaws binding nations and armies, in other words to create a
codex beUi; a law of war. All these attempts have hitherto, with some few
exceptions . . . , completely failed. If, therefore, in the follOWing work the
expression "the law of war" is used, it must be understood that by it is meant not a
lex scripta introduced by international agreements [although Germany had
become a party to the Hague Conventions in 1909], but only a reciprocity of
mutual agreement; a limitation of arbitrary behaviour, which custom and
conventionality, human friendliness and a calculating egotism have erected, but
for the observance of which there exists no express sanction, but only "the fear of
reprisals" decides. Consequently, the usage of war is even now the only means of
regulating the relations of belligerent States to one another. But with the idea of
the usages of war will always be bound up the character of something transitory,
inconstant, something dependent on factors outside the army. Nowadays it is not
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only the army which influences the spirit of the customs of war and assures
recognition of its unwritten laws. Since the almost universal introduction of
conscription, the peoples themselves exercise a profound effect upon this spirit.
In the modem usages of war one can no longer regard merely the traditional
inheritance of the ancient etiquette of the profession of arms, and the
professional outlook accompanying it, but there is also the deposit of the currents
of thought which agitate our time. But since the tendency of thought of the last
century was dominated essentially by humanitarian considerations which not
infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotion, there have not
been wanting attempts to influence the development of the usages of war in a
way which was in fundamental contradiction with the nature of war and its
object. Attempts of this kind will also not be wanting in the future, the more so as
these agitations have found a kind of moral recognition in some provisions of the
Geneva Convention and the Brussels and Hague Conferences. Moreover, the
officer is a child of his time. He is subject to the intellectual tendencies which
influence his own nation; the more educated he is the more will this be the case.
The danger that, in this way, he will arrive at false views of the essential character
of war must not be lost sight of. The danger can only be met by a thorough study
of war itself. By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard
himself against excessive humanitarian notions, it will teach him that certain
severities are indispensable to war, nay more, that the only true humanity very
often lies in a ruthless application of them.12S

The somewhat cynical and cavalier attitude to the law of war expounded
here finds its application as recently as 1941 in the reply of Field Marshal
Wilhelm Keitel to the warning by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris that the German
treatment of Soviet prisoners of war was contrary to international law: "The
objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous warfare. This is the
destruction of an ideology."126
Regardless of the German point of view, it is generally accepted that the
binding law of war today finds its origins in the Geneva and Hague
conventions. The latter are the product of the Conferences of 1899 and 1907
called at the initiative of Czar Nicholas II, and the principles established there
underlie what is now known as the "Law of the Hague." In 1899, in addition to
the Declaration against soft,nosed explosive bullets already referred to, there
appeared a ban on the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases, as well as
the first elementary effort to deal with aerial warfare by banning the launching
of projectiles from balloons. 127 For the main part, these Declarations were
regarded as temporary pending the calling of a third Hague Conference, which
has never taken place. However, even though not all the powers have ratified
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or acceded thereto, the general view is that they express rules of customary law.
That this is so is demonstrated by the Judgment of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg with its comment:
Several of the belligerents in the recent war were not parties to the [IVth]
Convention. . . . [B]y 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were
recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the
laws and customs of war.... The argument in defence of the charge with regard
to the murder and ill-treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, that the U.S.s.R. was
not a party to the Geneva Convention is quite without foundation. On the 15th
September 1941 Admiral Canaris protested against the regulations for the
treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. . . . He then stated[,] "The Geneva
Convention for the treatment of prisoners of war [to which the Soviet Union was
not a party] is not binding in the relationship between Germany and the
U.S.S.R.; therefore only the principles of general international law on the
treatment of prisoners of war apply. Since the 18th century, these have gradually
been established along the lines that war captivity is neither revenge nor
punishment, but solely protective custody, the only purpose of which is to
prevent the prisoners of war from further participation in the war. This principle
developed in accordance with the view held by all armies that it is contrary to
military tradition to kill or injure helpless people. . . . The decrees for the
treatment of Soviet prisoners of war enclosed are based on a fundamentally
different view-point." This protest which correctly stated the legal position, was
ignored. 128

It is now apt that reference be made to Convention II of 1899, as amended as
Convention IV in 1907. Many of its basic principles, and especially the
Preamble, are applicable mutatis mutandis in any theater of war:
Seeing that, while seeking means to preserve peace and prevent armed conflict
between nations, it is likewise necessary to bear in mind the cases where the
appeal to arms has been brought about by events which their care was unable to
avert; Animated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme case, the interests of
humanity and the ever progressive needs of civilization; Thinking it important, with
this object, to revise the general laws and customs of war, either with a view to
defining them with greater precision or to confirming them, within such limits as

would mitigate their severity as far as possible. ... [Tlhese provisions, the wording of
which has been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military
requirements permit, are intended to serve as a general rule of conduct for the
belligerents in their mutual relations and in their relations with the inhabitants. It has
not, however, been found possible at present to concert regulations covering all
the circumstances which arise in practice. On the other hand, the High
Contracting Parties clearly do not intend that unforeseen cases should, in the
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absence of a written undertaking, be left to the arbitrary judgment of military
commanders. Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High

Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not in the Regulations
adopted by them [and annexed to the Convention] the inhabitants and the
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of
nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. 129
The last sentence is known as the Martens Clause, after the Russian foreign
minister who introduced it. Its purpose was to deal with any lacunae or
unexpected situation that might arise, thereby preventing the possibility of any
belligerent contending that its actions were legitimate since they were not
expressly forbidden by the Convention. Today, it is understood to apply to
every armed conflict and tends to be embodied, either directly or by way of
paraphrase, in every treaty concerning the conduct of hostilities. Thus, Article
1, paragraph 2, of Protocol I, 1977, provides: "In cases not covered by the
Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants
remain under the protection and authOrity of the principles of international
law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from
the dictates of public conscience." Embodying the principle in the actual body
of the Protocol rather than, as had been the practice formerly, in the Preamble,
ensures that it has been elevated to become part of the mandatory law. It is
unfortunate, however, that no attempt has been made to define what
constitutes "the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public
conscience." Presumably, it is assumed that these are so well known and so
generally accepted as to render definition superfluous. Interestingly enough, in
the case of Protocol II dealing with non,international conflicts, the Clause
remains part of the Preamble. Since this is the first treaty effort to deal with
such conflicts, other than the short mini,bill of rights found in Article 3
common to the four 1949 Conventions, the reference to "established custom"
has, perhaps not unreasonably, been omitted.
In accordance with general treaty practice at the time, the Hague
Conventions contain a "general participation" clause, the effect of which is to
ensure that the Convention only applies during a conflict in which all the
belligerents are parties to the Convention claimed to be applicable. This would
mean that if any belligerent, however insignificant, even one only nominally a
party to the conflict but not contributing any forces or materiel, has not
acceded to the Convention, it would not be applicable even though the "real"
belligerents were all apparently bound thereby. This failing tended to give
added significance to the Martens Clause, with its reference to custom and the
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like. Moreover, the "real" belligerents in such circumstances have tended to
apply the Convention as between themselves,13o while to the extent that the
Convention reproduces customary law!3! or is regarded as having hardened
into such custom (as explained by the Nuremberg Tribunal) ,132 the "general
participation" clause has lost its significance; in fact, it is no longer used.
Instead, as is made clear in the 1949 Conventions, the present law operates "in
all circumstances ... [and a]lthough one of the Parties in conflict may not be a
Party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall
remain bound by it in their mutual relations ... [and] in relation to the said
Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisio.ns thereof."m
While the Hague and Geneva Conventions applied in both world wars, it
should be borne in mind that in none of them was any provision made for the
trial of individual offenders. The only reference to "liability" in the
then-existing black-letter law was Article 3 of Hague Convention W, which
provided that "a belligerent party which violates the provisions of the
regulations shall, if the case demand, be liable to pay compensation.... It shall
be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed
forces." It is on the basis of this provision that former prisoners of the Japanese
are seeking to recover personal compensation134-regardless of the fact that
unless it is clearly provided otherwise, only the States parties to the treaty
acquire enforceable rights thereunder135 and even though the Peace Treaty
with Japan136 liquidated personal claims, thus invalidating any claim that might
have been created under the 1907 Convention.
Although the Convention provides for state responsibility which, in
accordance with the normal rules of international law, amounts to an
international tort resulting from breach of treaty, it says nothing about the
liability of any officer ordering, nor of personal responsibility of any individual
committing, a breach. Therefore, until the establishment of the International
Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo at the end of World War II, all
trials of persons charged with committing breaches of the laws and customs of
war were conducted by national tribunals 137 applying customary international
law,138 the Hague Regulations,139 or, in the case of their own personnel, the
national military or criminal code.!40
It is sufficient for our purposes merely to mention the offenses within the
jurisdiction of the International Tribunals without going into excessive detail.
By the London Charter establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal,141 jurisdiction
was granted over crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity; the same was done in the case of the Tokyo tribunal. More
important perhaps than the judgments, was the General Assembly's Resolution
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affirming the Principles ofInternational Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Tribunal,142 especially as these were spelled out by the International Law
Commission in 1950:
1. Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under
international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.
II. The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which
constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who
committed the act from responsibility under international law.
III. The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime
under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government
of6.cial does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.
IV. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a
superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law,
provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.
V. Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a
fair trial on the facts and law.
VI. The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under
international law:
(a) Crimes against peace ....
(b) War crimes ....
(c) Crimes against humanity....
VII. Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a
crime against humanity ... is a crime under international law. 143

Perhaps it should be pointed out here that while the Principles deal explicitly
with superior orders, they do so only implicitly in so far as the counterpart of
command responsibility is concerned.144 By way of contrast, Protocol I is silent on
superior orders,145 but very specific on command responsibility.146 Moreover, the
Protocol has made it difficult for any superior to claim that he was unaware of the
law, since Article 82 requires legal advisers to be "available, when necessary, to
advise military commanders at the appropriate leveP47 on the application of the
Conventions and the Protocol [as well as] on the appropriate instruction to be
given to the armed forces on this subject."
The significance of the Nuremberg Judgment may be seen in the manner in
which subsequent national war crimes tribunals have referred to and applied
the principles stemming from that Judgment. 148 It has equally proved
significant in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunal established for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since
1991, particularly in relation to the concept of crimes against humanity.149
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A problem that confronts the ordinary man in the field is the legality of
weaponry. Some weapons are considered to be illegal per se, particularly those
which have become outdated, such as boiling oil (effective against besieging
forces) or those useful in dismounting knights in armor, such as the club, battle
axe, ball and chain, or heavy lance. ISO While a combatant would probably not
be held liable merely because he used the weapons issued to him, since he
would almost certainly not know what type of ammunition was in fact
permitted, it would be illegal for him, and subject him to trial, to alter the
weapons issued so as to cause injuries likely to result in unnecessary suffering,
which is forbidden in every text relating to conduct in bello.
Relatedly, particular States have occasionally sought to ban or declare illegal
the employment of "barbarian" forces. Thus, the German War Book
condemned as "closely connected with the unlawful instruments of war the
employment of uncivilized and barbarous peoples in European wars .... The
transference of African and Muhammedan T urcis to a European seat of war by
the French in the year 1870 was ... a retrogression from civilized to barbarous
warfare, as these troops had and could have no conception of
European-Christian culture, of respect for property, and the honour of women,
etc."ISI Today it is clear that such discrimination would be completely contrary
to the law, and the modem soldier must on no account discriminate among
enemy personnel on the basis of sex, race, nationality, religion, political
opinion or any other criteria.152 In other words, in accordance with the basic
humanitarian principles on which the law of armed conflict rests, all members
of an adverse party are entitled to equal protection. However, by Article 47 of
Protocol I, this basic principle of non-discrimination does not extend to
mercenaries, who are denied the status oflawful combatants and are therefore
not regarded as prisoners of war if captured. ls3
Since the adoption of Protocol II annexed to the 1980 Convention on
Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which
may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects,
the placing of booby traps-probably one of the easiest weapons for the
individual man in the field to make for himself-is illegal if employed as a
reprisal against civilians or indiscriminately placed so that it "may be expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof.,,154 It would not, however, be an offense for
him to booby-trap a building that has been evacuated by civilians and which he
reasonably anticipates is likely to be occupied by members of the adverse party's
armed forces.
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Other than the Conventional Weapons Convention, as amended, little by
way of treaty has been introduced to expand the scope of the law of war beyond
what is to be found in the Hague and Geneva Law. Perhaps the major
development of 1949, arising from the experience of occupied Europe during
World War II, was the adoption of Convention IV ISS relating to the protection
of civilians in occupied territory, although all that need be said of it here is that
it introduced criminal liability for those committing grave breaches against
such "protected" persons. The principal innovation of the four Conventions,
however, was the introduction of Article 3 into each of them. This
promulgated a minimal statement of rights that would apply even in a
non,international armed conflict. It is of interest to mention that the majority
of the Trial Chamber of the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia in the
Tadic case, while recognizing the Significance and application of Article 3,
rejected in the particular circumstances of that case the contention that the
Conventions, including the Civilians Convention, were applicable. 156 Some
effort had been made in 1977, with the adoption of Protocol 1,157 to extend the
law to certain conflicts previously regarded as non,international. By Article 1,
paragraph 4, wars of national liberation were raised to the level of international
armed conflicts governed by the provisions of the law of war, although by
Article 44, paragraph 3, protection is given to those who might be described as
"farmers by day and combatants by night," provided they "carry their arms
openly" during an engagement or while visible to the adversary during
deployment preparatory to launching an attack.
Extending the effort to humanize non,international conflicts, in which
traditionally the horrors are frequently far more grave and extensive than they
are in international conflicts, Protocol HI5S elaborates some measures of
humanitarian law which are applicable in a non' international conflict not
amounting to a war of national liberation, which would fall within the purview
of Protocol 1. While Protocol II forbids a variety of acts, it makes no provision
for punishment of breaches. Nor for that matter is common Article 3 of the
Conventions, which also deals with non, international conflicts, included in
any of the lists of grave breaches in the four Conventions or in Protocol 1. This
would imply that there is no way to deal with breaches of the law if committed
during a non,international conflict. However, since both Protocol II and
common Article 3 forbid certain types of action, it must be presumed that the
intention is that such activities must be amenable to trial and punishment.
Further, it should be noted that most of the acts forbidden by Protocol II, and
especially those listed in common Article 3, would, when directed against
humans, almost certainly amount to crimes against humanity, thus giving rise
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to universal jurisdiction. Moreover, the Statutes of both the ad hoc tribunals
established to deal with breaches of the law occurring in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia clearly envisage criminal jurisdiction as being applicable to
such conflicts,159 although the Judgment of the Trial Chamber in the Tadic
Case 160 has apparently reduced the significance of the Conventions in such
conflicts.
Among other developments in the law introduced in 1977-which to some
extent bring the modem law into line with such ecological injunctions as those
relating to the immunity of trees and the like in the Old Testament-are those
relating to protection of the natural environment. By Article 55 of Protocol I
"[c]are shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread,
and severe damage. This protection includes
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or
may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby
to prejudice the health and survival of the population." Even more in direct
line with the Old Testament or the military codes of the feudal period is Article
54, whereby it is forbidden "to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs,
agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking
water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of
denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population of the
adverse Party, whatsoever the motive."
Perhaps most likely to affect adversely the environment and cause
widespread,
and severe damage are nuclear weapons. However,
since the Intentional Committee of the Red Cross and the major powers
considered the issue to be one of disarmament rather than means or methods of
warfare, the Protocol does not deal with them in any way. It does, however,
grant protection to "works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely
dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations.,,161
However, there have been some developments outside of treaty in relation
to nuclear weapons. In 1996, the International Court ofJustice handed down
its Advisory Opinion on The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. 162
Pointing out that because it could not find "a conventional rule of general
scope, nor a customary rule specifically proscribing the threat or use of nuclear
weapons per se, it [became necessary to deal] with the question whether
recourse to nuclear weapons must be considered as illegal in the light of the
principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed
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conflict,"l63 bearing in mind the continued significance of the Martens Clause.
The court noted that
humanitarian law, at a very early stage, prohibited certain types of weapons
either because of their indiscriminate effects on combatants and civilians or
because of the unnecessary suffering caused to combatants,l64 that is to say, a
harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives. If
an envisaged use of weapons does not meet the requirements of humanitarian
law, a threat to engage in such use would also be contrary to that law....
[Moreover,) these fundamental rules [embodied in the Hague and Geneva
Conventions) are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified
the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible
principles of international customary law. 165

Inasmuch as it has been suggested that the accepted rules were irrelevant
since they developed before the invention of nuclear weapons, the Court noted
that the conferences of 1949 and 1994,1997 left these weapons aside, and
accepted that
there is a qualitative difference between nuclear weapons and all conventional
weapons. However, it cannot be concluded from this that the established
principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts did not apply
to nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion would be incompatible with the
intrinsically humanitarian character of the principles in question which permeates
the entire law of armed conflict and applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds
of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the future. l66

Having thus emphasised the validity of the rules of international
humanitarian law, it is perhaps not surprising that the Court found itself unable
to:
make a determination on the validity of the view that the recourse to nuclear
weapons would be illegal in any circumstances owing to their inherent and total
incompatibility with the law applicable in armed conflict. Certainly, ... the
principles and rules oflaw applicable in armed conflict-at the heart of which is
the overriding consideration of humanity-make the conduct of armed
hostilities subject to a number of strict requirements. Thus, methods and means
of warfare, which would preclude any distinction between civilian and military
targets, or which would result in unnecessary suffering to combatants, are
prohibited. In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, ... the use
of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for such
requirements. Nevertheless, the Court considers that it does not have sufficient
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elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons
would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules applicable in armed
conflict in any circumstance.... 167

In the light of this reasoning, the Court concluded that it
cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every State to survival, and thus the
right to resort to self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 [of the Charter],
when survival is at stake. . . . Accordingly, in view of the present state of
international law viewed as a whole, the Court is led to observe that it cannot
reach a definite conclusion as to the legality or use of nuclear weapons by a State
in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at
stake .... HiS

All one can say on the basis of the Court's Opinion is that the use or threat
to use a nuclear weapon would be contrary to the principles of international
humanitarian law and therefore illegal. However, in circumstances in which a
state may feel-and this is a matter of pure auto-interpretation for the State
itself-that its very survival is at stake, then a recourse to the use of this
weapon might nevertheless be lawful!
Just as there is no blacbletter law with regard to nuclear weapons, so there is
no treaty law concerning aerial warfare. However, in 1923 a Committee of
Experts drew up a code of draft Rules of Air Warfare 169 which are generally
regarded as, "to a great extent, correspond[ing] to the customary rules and
general principles underlying the conventions on the law of war on land and at
sea.'1170 We also find in the decision of the Nagasaki District Court, when
considering the legality of the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
some judicial comment to support this view:
The Draft Rules of Air Warfare cannot directly be called positive law, since they
have not yet become effective as authoritative with regard to air warfare.
However, international jurists regard the Draft Rules as authoritative with
regard to air warfare. Some countries regard the substance of the rules as a
standard of action by armed forces, and the fundamental principles of the Draft
Rules are consistently in conformity with international law regulations and
customs at the time. Therefore, we can safely say that the prohibition of
indiscriminate aerial bombardment on an undefended city and the principle of
military objective which are provided by the Draft Rules, are international
customary law [allowing for developments in terminology, this finding has much
in common with the Opinion of the W orId Court], also from the point that they
are in common with the principle in land and sea warfare. Further, since the
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distinction of land, sea and air warfare is made by the place and purpose of
warfare, we think that there is also sufficient reason for argument that, regarding the
aerial bombardment of a city on land, the laws and regulations respecting land warfare
analogically apply since the aerial bombardment is made on land. l7l
This last statement prophetically foretells Article 49 of Protocol I, which is
part of the Section (Part IV, Section I) relating to General Protection against
Effects of Hostilities, and is itself concerned with the definition of attacks and
scope of application. By paragraph 3, "[ t] he provisions of this Section apply to
any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the civilian population,
individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all
attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land but do not
otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at
sea or in the air."
From what has been said herein, it is clear that since earliest times there
has been recognition that humanity and the future survival of society demand
that limitations be placed upon the means and methods of warfare, and that
this remains the case today, whether the hostilities take place in international
or non,international conflicts. As is made clear by the Martens Clause, which
the World Court has indicated is just as significant today as it was when
Martens introduced it, when seeking the law of war it is not enough to look
merely at the written documents which have been drawn up and accepted by
States as treaties. These may be considered as reflecting what has developed
in practice as representing what States are prepared to impose upon their
armed forces by way of restrictions on their freedom of action. Although it
may not always be easy to ascertain what are claimed to be the customary
rules in this regard, the principles of humanity and the dictates of public
conscience, taken together with consideration of the accepted practices of
the most significant military forces, are probably sufficiently well known and
accepted to provide the guidance necessary to understand what is meant by
those terms. Despite the fact that modern tribal wars seem to suggest that
what was formerly regarded as being almost universally accepted behavior
may not now be so considered, it may be suggested that the principles referred
to are no more or less than what Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice refers to as general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations-even though they may be nothing more than the principles which
"we and our friends, all of whom are civilized," generally recognize as
constituting principles of law and as such binding!
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This paper is based on an article orginially published in 1994 Finnish Year Book of
International Law 93.
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